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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
Case No,
Priority No. 13

PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Court of Appeals appropriately applied case law from
this Court in reaching its decision.

The trial judge abused his

discretion in refusing to remove Juror VanLeeuwen for cause where
(1) the trial judge originally granted Mr. Woolley's challenge of
VanLeeuwen, then reinstated him; (2) the judge removed for cause two
other jurors who had been victims of similar crimes; and (3) the
judge failed to adequately question the jurors about the prior
victimization.
The consistent and repeated holding of this Court that a
new trial is required when a criminal defendant is forced to use a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who the trial judge should
have removed for cause is based on state statutory and
constitutional law.

The decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81

(1988), does not affect that holding since that decision focused on

Oklahoma law which requires a defendant to use a peremptory
challenge to remove a juror who is erroneously not removed for
cause.

The Ross court's decision that such a law does not violate

the sixth and fourteenth amendments does not impact on Utah law.

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was issued on
April 10, 1991 and can be found at State v. Woolley. 158 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

A copy of the opinion is contained in

Addendum A.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant statutes and constitutional provisions are
contained in Addendum D to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Respondent, Paul Edwin Woolley, was convicted
by a jury of two counts of Forgery, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1989).

R. 44, 72-3.

The trial judge sentenced him to serve two concurrent terms of zero
to five years at the Utah State Prison.
Mr. Woolley appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

That court reversed his convictions in a decision issued

April 10, 1991.
The State did not file a petition for rehearing in the
Court of Appeals in this case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI
SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY FOLLOWED
AND ANALYZED DECISIONS OF THIS COURT,
The decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent with
decisions of this Court.

See State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883

(Utah 1981); State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 766-8 (Utah 1980);
State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989).

Requiring the trial

court to investigate further or remove a challenged juror for cause
where the juror has indicated that he or she has been the victim of
a similar crime presents a logical, straightforward rule for trial
courts.

This Court has recognized that "it is a simple matter to

obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror
and selecting another."
1981).

Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah

It is also a simple matter, which could have an overwhelming

impact on the impartiality of the jury and the fairness of the
trial, to investigate further where a question of bias is raised.
See generally State v. Bailey. 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980);
State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989).
Although the State apparently claims that being the
victim of a similar crime does not raise an inference of bias,
common sense dictates that a question as to the juror7s impartiality
is raised where the juror was a victim of a similar crime.

See

generally People v. Diaz. 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79-85 (Cal. App. 4
Dist. 1984) (discussing strong potential for bias where juror had
previously been victim of a crime similar to that with which

- 3
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defendant was charged); State v. Brooks, 631 P. 2d at 883-84 (jurors
who were victims of similar crime which affected their impartiality
should have been excused for cause).

Notions of fairness require

that a trial judge probe further or dismiss the juror.
In its argument for certiorari, the State fails to
mention significant factual bases which the majority of the Court of
Appeals relied on in reaching its decision.
During voir dire, three potential jurors indicated that
they had been victims of crimes which were similar to that with
which Mr. Woolley was charged.

Tl:32, 33, 74-6.

transcript relevant to this issue.

See Addendum B for

Rather than asking the three

jurors what their reactions were to the crimes, the trial judge
asked the jurors as a group to raise their hands if they thought the
experience would preclude them from being fair.
raised his hand.

None of the jurors

Tl:33.

At the conclusion of voir dire, during a bench
conference, defense counsel challenged all three jurors for cause.
Tl:35, 74-5.

The trial judge initially struck all three jurors for

cause, then reinstated Juror VanLeeuwen.

R. 46; Tl 74-5.1

1. Although the majority recognized that the trial judge had
initially struck Juror VanLeeuwen for cause and later reinstated him
(Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39-40), the dissent claimed in
footnote 8 that the record does not reflect such an unusual
occurrence. Id. at 46. However, the jury list contained in the
district court file, which is part of the official record in this
case, establishes that the trial judge removed Jurors Tyler, Hoyt
and VanLeeuwen (VanLeeuwen is "#2" for cause, Tyler is "#1" and Hoyt
is "#3") and later crossed out the notation following VanLeeuwen's
name. R. 4 6 (see Addendum C for copy of jury list). Defense
counsel made a record of this unusual occurrence of reinstating a
(footnote continued)
- 4
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In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals focused on
the fact that the trial judge had initially removed the juror for
cause.

(Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36, 39). The majority

stated:
Once a trial judge has found that a juror
should be removed for cause, it is highly
unusual for this juror to be reinstated without
further voir dire to develop new facts to
support the change in direction.
Id. at 39-40.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the trial
judge had removed for cause two other jurors who had been victims of
crimes similar to that which was charged in the instant case.

The

only distinction between those two jurors and VanLeeuwen which is
evident in the record is the factual discrepancies involved in the
prior crimes.

The Court of Appeals noted that the facts of the

prior crimes indicated that VanLeeuwen was the most likely of the
three to be biased as the result of the prior victimization.

(footnote 1 continued)
juror who was at first removed for cause, and neither the State nor
the trial judge took issue with defense counsel's representation
that the judge had initially struck VanLeeuwen for cause.
Tl:74-77. During oral argument in the Court of Appeals, counsel for
the State conceded that this unusual occurrence had transpired and
acknowledged that had the trial judge granted all three challenges,
there would not have been enough jurors to proceed unless the State
had agreed to waive one of its peremptory challenges. (See
Rule 18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (allowing each party
four peremptory challenges)). Unfortunately, the microphone at the
podium was apparently not turned on during oral argument, and these
statements by the State's attorney were not recorded. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that in its petition for writ of certiorari,
the State does not take the position that this highly unusual
circumstance did not occur.

- 5
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In actuality, based on the meager information
gathered by the trial court, VanLeeuwen was
objectively the most likely of the three
previously victimized jurors to be biased.
•

• •

[W]e find no persuasive distinction between
VanLeeuwen and the other two prospective jurors
who had also been victims of similar crimes and
who the trial judge presumably found could not
be fair and impartial as he removed them for
cause.
Id. at 40. 2
This Court has recognized that where the trial court
removed other jurors who gave answers which were similar to those of
the disputed juror, the trial judge must either remove the
challenged juror for cause or investigate further.

See State v.

Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473,
475 (Utah 1987).

In State v. Jones, 734 P.2d at 475 n.l, this Court

stated:
We note that the trial court excused two other
prospective jurors for cause because of their
statements that they would expect the defendant
to prove his innocence. Neither of these other
jurors indicated that he had any direct ties to
the murder victim or the victim's family, only
that the juror held a generalized belief that a
defendant should have to prove his innocence.
This makes the trial court's failure to dismiss
Ms. Opheikens for cause even more anomalous in
light of her similar statement and her direct
ties to the victim's family.
See also State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (where trial court failed
to remove juror for cause who had agreed with comments of another
juror who court did remove for cause, the trial court "had the duty

2. The Court of Appeals also expressed concern about the limited
voir dire conducted in this case, and the failure of the trial judge
to individually question the jurors, Id. at 39, 40.
- 6
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to remove [the juror] for bias or investigate further until the
inference of bias was rebutted . • . " ) .
In Bailey, this Court pointed out that where juror
response "facially raised a question of bias," the trial court was
required to remove the juror for cause or investigate further.
see also State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989).3

Id.;

The

inference or question of bias raised in the present case required
that the trial judge investigate further or remove VanLeeuwen for
cause.

Forcing Mr. Woolley to use a peremptory challenge to remove

VanLeeuwen requires a new trial.
The State argues only that an inference of bias was not
raised; it does not argue that if such an inference were raised, it
was rebutted.

This Court has consistently held that where an

inference of bias is raised, it cannot be rebutted simply by the

3. In his dissent, Judge Bench makes a distinction between a
"question" of bias and an "inference" of bias raised by juror
responses. Judge Bench appears to acknowledge that in this case a
"question about potential bias [was raised] which requires general
probing into the prospective juror's state of mind in light of that
experience." Id. at 42.
This Court has never drawn a distinction between a
"question" of bias and an "inference" of bias, and has used the two
terms interchangeably. See State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768;
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126. As the majority pointed out:
We find no distinction in Utah case law between
a "question of bias" and an "inference of
bias." Furthermore, we find no good policy
reason not to require probing to clarify any
possible prejudice when fundamental rights are
at stake. Such narrow line drawing would only
cause confusion for trial judges . . . A
broader and simpler statement of the rule
actually gives trial judges clearer direction
and more latitude in ferreting out potential
bias.
Id. at 37.
- 7
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juror's statement that he or she can be fair.

As the Court stated

in State v. Jones. 734 P.2d at 475, citing Brooks II. 631 P.2d at
884:

"When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of bias, a

later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an impartial
verdict cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of bias."
Furthermore, "[a] statement made by a prospective juror that he
intends to be fair and impartial loses its meaning in light of other
testimony or facts that suggest bias."
22, 26 (Utah 1984).

State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d

See also State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah

1985) (juror may not be able to recognize influence of improper
contacts); People v. Diazf 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
1984) (recognition that statement regarding ability to deliberate
impartially is self-serving).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals analyzed and
followed case law from this Court.

There is no basis for this Court

to grant certiorari on this issue.

POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
DECIDED BY THIS COURT, AND THE REVERSIBLE
NATURE OF THIS ISSUE IS GROUNDED ON STATE
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In a footnote to its argument in its opening brief, the
State, without analysis, requested that the Court of Appeals
"reevaluate its previous decisions in light of Ross [v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 81 (1988)]" should that court "determine that
Mr. VanLeeuwen should have been excused for cause[.]"

- 8
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State's brief

at 10, footnote 1.

Both the majority and dissenting Court of

Appeals opinions in this case similarly relegated their discussions
of Ross to footnote status.
Rep. at 41, n.5, 47, n.12.

See State v. Woollev, 158 Utah Adv.
The State now asserts that through these

various footnotes, "the court of appeals decided an important
question of law which has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court."

State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8.4

Contrary to

the State's claims, a reassessment of this Court's repeated holding
that prejudicial error occurs where a party is required to use a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed
for cause should not be reviewed by this Court in this case.
Furthermore, the holding in Ross does not require any
change in existing Utah law.

In Ross, the United States Supreme

Court determined that Oklahoma law which limited the exercise of
peremptory challenges by requiring that the defendant use his
peremptories to cure erroneous denials of challenges for cause did
not violate the sixth and fourteenth amendments unless a juror who

4. It should be noted that the State did not file a petition for
rehearing in this case. Hence, it did not brief its argument under
Ross v. Oklahoma prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals, nor
did it take advantage of the opportunity to brief the argument by
asking the court to reconsider the discussion contained in
footnote 5 to the majority opinion. Although Ross was discussed
during oral argument in the Court of Appeals, the microphone at the
podium apparently was not on during argument, and it is impossible
to hear the attorneys' voices. Appellate counsel cannot recall the
extent to which the issue was argued; however, following oral
argument, defense counsel filed a letter of supplemental authorities
citing State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Ariz. App. 1990), in
support of her position during oral argument that Ross does not
affect the repeated holdings of this Court.
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should have been removed for cause actually sits on the jury.5
By contrast, Utah law does not require the use of
peremptory challenges to cure erroneous denials of challenges for
cause; instead, Utah law requires a new trial where a defendant is
required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should
have been removed for cause.

See State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459

(Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989).
In Julian, a post-Ross case, this Court stated:
This Court has repeatcsdly held that it is
prejudicial error to compel a party to exercise
a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective
juror who should properly have been removed for
cause. [footnote omitted]
This repeated holding is grounded on Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which this Court quoted immediately following
the above statement in Julian.
Virtually all of the cases cited in footnote 11 in
support of this proposition in Julian refer to Rule 18, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure and/or Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution as the basis for this holding.

See, e.g., State v.

Jones. 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (citing Article I, section 12
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14)

5.

In footnote 4, the Court stated:
We need not decide the broader question
whether, in the absence of Oklahoma's
limitation on the "right" to exercise
peremptory challenges, "a denial or impairment"
of the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs
if the defendant uses one or more challenges to
remove jurors who should have been removed for
cause. [citations omitted]
Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. at 91.
- 10 -

[without referring to the sixth or fourteenth amendments] in support
of holding that prejudicial error occurs when trial court refuses to
dismiss juror for cause, thereby requiring defendant to use
peremptory challenge); State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d at 25; State v.
Bailey, 605 P.2d at 767-88.

Utah law, not the sixth and fourteenth

amendments, is the consistent basis for this repeated holding.
Because this Court's repeated and consistent holding that
requiring a defendant to use a peremptory challenge to remove a
juror who should have been removed for cause is based on state law
and not the sixth and fourteenth amendments, Ross v. Oklahoma has no
impact on that holding.

The majority of the Court of Appeals panel

which heard this case recognized that this holding is based on Utah
law and unaffected by the Ross decision in footnote 5 to its
decision.

That footnote states in part:
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian
after Ross was decided. We assume that the
court considered Ross when deciding Gotschall
and Julian, but chose to stay with its
long-standing rule that "[a] court commits
prejudicial error if it forces a party to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror who should have been removed
for cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; see
also Julian, 771 P.2d at 1046 n.ll.
Accordingly, we assume this is still the law in
Utah.

Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (emphasis added).
In State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1990), the
court rejected the State#s argument that Ross v. Oklahoma required
that a case not be reversed unless a juror who should have been
excused for cause actually sat on the jury.

- 11 -

The Sexton court

focused on the Ross court's reliance on Oklahoma's law which
requires that a defendant use his peremptory challenges to remove
jurors who should have been removed for cause, and pointed out:
Our case differs from Ross, Unlike Oklahoma,
Arizona law does not require a defendant to use
peremptory challenges to cure a trial court's
erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause.
The rule in Arizona is that the right to
peremptory challenges is so substantial that
forcing a party to use a peremptory challenge
to strike potential jurors who should have been
stricken for cause denies the litigant a
substantial right. [citations omitted].
Sexton, 787 P.2d at 1099.
The reversible nature of the type of error which occurred
in this case is well established in Utah law.

The Court of Appeals

did not decide an important issue which should have been decided by
this Court, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent
with Ross.
Mr. Woolley respectfully requests that this Court deny
certiorari on this issue.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Woolley respectfully requests that this Court deny
the State's petition for writ of certiorari.
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SUBMITTED this

/ ~7~ day of July, 1991.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Respondent
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State v.

Provo, Utah

158 Utah /

let alone analyze, why the dismissal of her
fraud claim was error. Generally, where an
appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the
point is waived. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of
Calif, v. State, 677 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Alaska
1984) (points initially raised on appeal but not
briefed are considered abandoned); Quality
Furniture, Inc. v. Hay, 61 Haw. 89, 595 P.2d
1066, 1068 (1979) (issues raised but not argued
in brief are waived); Northwest National Gas
Co. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 53 Or. App.
89, 630 P.2d 1326, 1329 (assigned errors not
briefed are waived), review denied, 291 Or.
893, 642 P.2d 309 (1981); Kurpjuweit v.
Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46
(Wyo. 1985) (errors not asserted are waived or
abandoned). Because Pixton has not articulated how the district court erred, and we find
no support for her fraud claim in the record,
we affirm the trial court's ruling on appeal.
Judith M. Billings, Judge

v. Rep. 35
35
ings suit against the tortfeasor] by deceit, non disclosure, reneging on promises, violation of industry
custom and deliberate attempts to obfuscate." Id. at
577.
Finally, we are not persuaded that the analysis of
the Arizona court is consistent with Beck. Cf. Hettwer
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 118 Idaho
373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990) (refusing to adopt Rawlings
approach when reviewing dismissal of third-party
bad faith claims of party insured by same insurance
company as tortfeasor because Rawlings involved
imposition of a tort-based duty in a first-party
situation).

Cite as

158 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Paul Edwin WOOLLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Contrasting first-party situations with thirdparty situations, we note that in a first-party situation the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted by
the insured for losses suffered by the insured. In a
third-party situation, however, the insurer agrees
to defend the insured against claims made by thirdparties against the insured and to pay resulting liability up to a specified amount. See Beck v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 n.2 (Utah 1985).
2. We note that Pixton relies on Rawlings v.
Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565 (1986) as
authority directly supporting the imposition of a
duty of good faith and fair dealing where an insurer
is both the first-party insurer and the tortfeasor's
insurer and where the insurer has unreasonably
impeded recovery on the liability policy. We agree
that Rawlings did impose a duty in this context.
However, the duty of good faith and fair dealing
outlined by the Arizona court is one sounding in
tort. Utah has carefully adopted a more restrictive
contract approach. Furthermore, the actions of the
insurer in Rawlings amounted to an independent
tort. Cf. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 705,
800 n.3 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that some acts that
breach a contract give rise to tort causes of action
independent of an implied covenant of good faith).
In the Arizona case, the Rawlings had a $10,000 fire
policy with Farmers. The Rawlings suffered a
$40,000 fire loss. The Rawlings belie\ed the fire was
negligently caused by a third-party and informed
Farmers of this fact. Farmers agreed to investigate
Rawlings' suspicion and to give Rawlings a copy of
the written report resulting from the investigation.
Upon investigation, the Farmers adjustor learned
that Farmers also had a $100,000 liability policy
covering the tortfeasor. Farmers never informed
Rawlings of this insurance policy. Thereafter,
Farmers refused to give Rawlings the report and
intentionally withheld critical information necessary
for Rawlings to pursue its claim against the tortfeasor. The Arizona court characterized the conduct
as follows: "The evidentiary facts indicate that
Farmers pursued its objective (of preventing Rawl-

No. 900012-CA
FILED: April 10, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
ATTORNEYS:
Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Joan C. Watt, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and
Greenwood.
AMENDED OPINION*
Billings, Judge:
Defendant Paul Edwin Woolley appeals
from his conviction of two counts of forgery,
a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1989). Defendant
claims the trial court committed reversible
error by failing either to remove a juror for
cause or to ask questions to probe his potential bias when the juror admitted he had been
a victim of forgery. We reverse and remand
for a new trial.
FACTS
During voir dire of potential jurors in defendant's trial, the court, at the request of
defendant's counsel, asked: "Are there those
among you ... , members of the panel, who
have yourselves been the victim of a forgery or
a crime involving deception or fraud?" Three
potential jurors, Mark Hoyt, Chris VanLeeuwen, and James Tyler, responded affirmatively. Hoyt explained that his wallet was taken

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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when he was in California and that his credit
card was used. VanLeeuwen related that when
he was in Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and
wrote about $5,000 worth of checks on his
account. Similarly, Tyler explained that some
of his checks were stolen in 1961 when he
lived in Los Angeles and that someone had
forged his signature on some of those checks.
Following these responses, the trial court
asked Hoyt, VanLeeuwen, and Tyler, as a
group, one general follow-up question:
Those three of you who have responded, recognizing that this is a
different time and place and circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be
fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside
that experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear
and the credibility of the witnesses?
If you would not be able to do so, I
want you to raise your hand.
None of those questioned raised his hand.
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial
court requested counsel to pass the jury for
cause. The defense refused and requested a
sidebar conference. During the conference,
defense counsel asked the court to remove
Hoyt, Tyler, and VanLeeuwen because of their
admissions to having been victims of similar
crimes. The trial judge initially struck all three
of the challenged jurors for cause. 1 Subsequently, however, the court reinstated juror
VanLeeuwen, explaining its action by stating
that VanLeeuwen need not be removed
because the forgery occurred in a foreign
country. Defense counsel objected to the reinstatement of VanLeeuwen and subsequently
removed VanLeeuwen by peremptory challenge.
Defendant was convicted on both counts of
forgery and was sentenced tc two concurrent
terms of zero to five years. Defendant argues
on appeal that the court committed reversible
error in reinstating VanLeeuwen.
REMOVAL OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for
cause is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. When reviewing such a ruling, we
reverse only if the trial court has abused its
discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459,
462 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Larson, 775
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).2 The Utah
Supreme Court has noted, however, that the
exercise of the trial court's discretion in selecting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed
"in light of the fact that it is a simple matter
to obviate any problem of bias simply by
excusing the prospective juror and selecting

CODE • C(
Provo. Ulai

another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533.
536 (Utah 1981).*
The Utah Supreme Court has consistent!}
emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] dut>
to see that the constitutional right of an
accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded,"
Stare v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah
1977), and has reversed criminal convictions
based solely on the appearance that such right
may have been jeopardized. 4 Accordingly, trial
courts must adequately probe a juror's potential bias when that juror's responses or other
facts suggest a bias. The court's discretion is
properly exercised when deciding whether to
dismiss a juror for cause only after this investigation takes place.
A party is entitled to use peremptory challenges to remove jurors who are not properly
removed for cause. Stare v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks 11"); State v.
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Utah 1977)
("Brooks I"); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d
1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). It is prejudicial error
to compel a party to exercise a peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror who
should have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; Stare v. Julian, 111
P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989).*
A. Juror Impartiality
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah
1988). Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)
implements these constitutional mandates and
offers guidance as to when a juror should be
removed for cause. This rule provides in relevant part:
The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may
be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(14) That a state of mind exists on
the part of the juror with reference
to the cause, or to either party,
which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging ....
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14).
Juror impartiality is a "mental attitude of
appropriate indifference." Bishop, 753 P.2d at
451 (citing Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801). "Chief
Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of
Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury
as one composed of persons who 'will fairly
hear the testimony which may be offered to
them, and bring in their verdict, according to
that testimony, and according to the law
arising on it.'" Srare v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,
767 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted).
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assessing whether a juror should be
ved for cause, the supreme court has
the following guidance:
Light impressions which may fairly
3e supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered; which
[nay leave the mind open to a fair
:onsideration of that testimony,
constitute no sufficient objection to
a juror; but ... those strong and
deep impressions which will close
the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to
them; which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.
m, 771 P.2d at 1064-65 (citations
ted).
nee a juror's impartiality has been put in
3t, a trial judge must investigate by further
tions to determine if the juror has merely
it impressions" or impressions which are
3ng and deep" and which will affect the
r's impartiality. "When comments are
e which facially question a prospective
r's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of
retion may occur unless the challenged
r is removed by the court or unless the
*t or counsel investigates and finds the
rence rebutted." State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d
5, 1126 (Utah 1989); see also Bishop, 735
i a t 451.
he dissent concludes that the mere fact
a juror was the victim of the same crime
which the defendant is on trial does not
e an "inference of bias" but merely a
estion of bias." The dissent claims, there:, that under these circumstances, a trial
ge is not required to probe the juror to
ermine whether the potential bias is merely
light impression," thus allowing the juror
remain, or an "impression which is deep
strong," in which case the court should
iove the juror for cause.
VQ find no distinction in Utah case law
ween a "question of bias" and an
ference of bias." Furthermore, we find no
»d policy reason not to require probing to
ify any possible prejudice when fundameI rights are at stake. Such narrow line
wing would only cause confusion for trial
ges. First, judges would be required to
ermine if there was a potential for bias.
<t, they would have to determine whether it
into the class of a "question of bias"
ere minimal investigation was required or
"inference of bias" where more thorough
^stioning was required. A broader and
ipler statement of the rule actually gives
il judges clearer direction and more latitude
Arreting out potential bias.
iVe agree with the dissent that a trial judge
the first instance conducts voir dire to
)be for potential bias. That is what the trial
UTAH
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judge did in the instant case when he asked
the potential jurors if any of them had been a
victim of forgery. This probe did reveal a
"question" or an "inference" of bias on the
part of three potential jurors. Thus, we
believe, contrary to the dissent, that "because
the probing revealed a potential for bias," the
trial judge was required to address the potential bias "through rehabilitative inquiry" until
this "inference" or "question" was rebutted.
This is precisely what the trial judge attempted
to do.
Additionally, we do not understand what
the dissent means by a "per se" inference of
bias and reject any such nomenclature. If "per
se" as used by the dissent means that a potential juror's prior victimization of the same
crime for which the defendant is on trial raises
an inference such that the trial judge must
probe the juror to insure that he or she can
decide the case impartially despite the past
victimization, we do so hold. This rule,
however, is not appropriately categorized as a
"per se" rule as there is no result which automatically follows. If, however, "per se" as
used by the dissent means that a potential
juror's prior victimization creates an inference
such that the juror's removal is mandated, we
clearly reject such a position. We simply find,
as did the trial judge, that the responses of the
potential jurors that they had been victims of
the same crime for which the defendant was
being tried were "comments" which raised a
facial question as to each prospective juror's
impartiality, thus requiring further probing by
the trial judge.
The dissent relies heavily on the recent Utah
Court of Appeals decision in State v. Jonas,
793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for the
proposition that a prospective juror's prior
victimization of the same crime with which the
defendant is charged does not raise an inference of bias. We agree that there is some
troublesome language in Jonas but find its
result consistent with our conclusion in the
instant case. In Jonas, a prospective juror
disclosed during voir dire that she had been
the victim of theft, the offense with which the
defendant had been charged. The Jonas trial
judge correctly asked the juror no less than
ten individual follow-up questions probing
her potential bias and her answers dispelled
any inference of bias. Against this backdrop,
the court of appeals found no reversible error
when the trial court refused to remove her for
cause.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals did
state that the prospective juror's initial comments did not raise an inference of bias such
that the juror should have been excused for
cause. The court based its conclusion,
however, on the juror's responses to the trial
court's many questions. We think the Jonas
analysis confuses the two-part test of Cobb6
and reject it to the extent it holds that being a
NCK REPORTS
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victim of the same crime with which the defendant is charged does not raise an inference
or question of bias such that the court mustjust as the Jonas court did~investigate
further to probe the juror's ability to be fair
and impartial.
B. Investigation Necessary to Probe Potential
Bias

The level of investigation necessary once
voir dire reveals potential juror bias will vary
from case to case and is necessarily dependent
on the juror's responses to the questions
asked. Nevertheless, the exploration should
not be merely pro forma.
When an inference of bias is raised, the
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a
subsequent general statement by the juror that
he or she can be fair and impartial. As the
supreme court has stated, "[a] statement made
by a juror that she intends to be fair and
impartial loses much of its meaning in light of
other testimony and facts which suggest a
bias." State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26
(quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). Accordingly, "[tjhe court, not the juror, must determine a juror's qualifications." Sfare v. Jones,
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (quoting Brooks
7/,631P.2dat884).
Utah case law is helpful in determining the
depth of inquiry which has been sufficient to
clarify potential juror bias. In Bailey, 605
P.2d at 771, the defendant was charged with
distribution of a controlled substance. At trial,
the only witness to testify was the undercover
police officer who made the arrest. During
voir dire of the jury panel, prospective jurors
were asked if they would be inclined to give
the testimony of a police officer greater weight
than that of a witness who was not a police
officer. A prospective juror stated, "you can
rely upon their testimony and their background to the utmost .... I would want to stand
behind them a hundred percent." Id. at 768.
In response to this facial comment of bias, the
trial court responded by asking only one
question as to the juror's expressed bias.
Being satisfied that the juror could act impartially, the court did not remove the juror for
cause. Id. Ultimately, the defendant was
convicted and appealed. The supreme court
reversed and remanded, noting that the trial
court's minimal investigation and questioning
was insufficient to rebut the inference of bias.
The court stated that "[t]he [trial] Court's one
question was not sufficient to rebut this inference," adding that "the Court had insufficient
evidence on which to base a conclusion that
there was no bias ...." Id.
In Jonas, 793 P.2d at 902, the trial judge asked eleven different questions in establishing the
impartiality of a prospective juror who had been
the victim of a theft, the crime with which the
defendant was charged. Similarly, in Salt Lake
City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). the trial court made "signifi-
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cant efforts" to determine if a potential juror in
a case involving driving under the influence of
alcohol could remain unbiased given the fact
that his wife had been "broadsided by a drunk
driver." Id. at 1282.
The depth of questioning necessary is
further illustrated by a case very similar to the
instant case; Brooks II, 631 P.2d at 878. Brooks
II involved a defendant charged with
burglary for unlawfully entering a basement
apartment with the intent to commit theft.
During voir dire of the jury venire, two prospective jurors stated that they had been
victims of the same or similar crimes. One
juror responded that his home had been burglarized twice. The other juror noted that she
had been the victim of an armed robbery and
assault in her home. Because of the possible
biases created by this prior victimization, the
court asked multiple questions of these two
jurors. Both jurors indicated that they had
strong feelings about their experiences but felt
that they could render a fair and impartial
verdict based on the evidence. Both jurors,
therefore, were retained.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the
jurors had not been rehabilitated by the
court's questioning and should have been
excused for cause. See id.; see also Gotschall,
782 P.2d at 459 (A prospective juror made
statements that evidenced a lack of understanding of the prosecution's burden of proof
and the defendant's right not to take the
stand. The trial judge asked the juror fourteen
questions before determining that he need not
be excused for cause. The supreme court affirmed.); Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1123 (A prospective juror in a second-degree murder trial
expressed strong feelings against the taking of
human life. This juror was asked eleven questions before the court determined that he
could serve impartially. The supreme court
affirmed.); 7 Julian, 111 P.2d at 1061
(Prospective juror in a trial involving charges
of sodomy on a child made comments which
facially indicated she was predisposed to
believe the victims' testimony and was thus
incapable of rendering an impartial verdict.
This juror was asked twenty separate questions
before the trial court decided she could act
impartially. On appeal, the supreme court held
that the juror had been rehabilitated.); Tuero,
745 P.2d at 1283 (The wife of a prospective
juror in a case involving driving under the
influence of alcohol had been "broadsided by
a drunk driver." The court made "significant
efforts" to determine that this juror could
remain unbiased. The court of appeals affirmed.); Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965,
967 (Utah Ct. App.) (The defendant in a trial
involving driving under the influence of
alcohol believed that two prospective jurors
were partial. One juror was associated with
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers; the other
juror was a reserve police officer in an adjoi-
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y. Before these jurors were impaneled,
ve "substantial assurances," by way of
es to "specific, detailed questioning" by
irt, that they could be fair and imparhe court of appeals affirmed.), cert.
765P.2d 1277(1987).
dissent contends that the instant case is
3us to Hornsby v. Corporation of the
ng Bishop of the Church of Jesus
of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929
Ct. App. 1988), claiming this court in
ase held that one general question to
ctive jurors was sufficient to detect any
hich would warrant removal for cause.
. at 932. We disagree. Hornsby did not
on the issue of removal of a juror for
iornsby, the plaintiff was seeking recoYom the Church of Jesus Christ of
-Day Saints ("L.D.S. Church") for
s sustained by the plaintiff when he
\& his motorcycle to avoid colliding with
xh-owned cow on a public highway. At
ime of voir dire, plaintiff proposed
1 questions to the trial court regarding
"filiation of the prospective jurors with
.D.S. Church. The trial court rejected
questions, stating that the religious prees of the jurors were none of the court's
;ss. Instead, the court asked one general
on:
ire there any of you who feel that
ou would have trouble being an
npartial juror because of feelings
ou may have either pro or con
/ith regard to the L.D.S. Church
hat you think might affect your
ibility to be a fair and impartial
uror in this case? If so, I'd like
'ou to raise your hand.
931-32.
rnsby objected to the trial court's action
subsequently filed an appeal, claiming
the trial court erred in limiting voir dire
ding the panel's religious affiliations,
rdingly, the issue on appeal, as clearly
i by this court, was whether the trial
erred in refusing to voir dire members of
Liry panel concerning their affiliation with
L.D.S. Church such that the defendant
1 knowingly exercise his peremptory chaes. We found the court had erred by
ing voir dire.
le dissent refers to a small portion of dicta
iornsby which can be misleading when
i out of context: "[tjhe question asked by
trial court was sufficient to detect any
al subjective bias to warrant a challenge
cause ...." Id. at 932. The dissent,
ever, fails to mention the following sent: "[bjecause it is not necessary to this
'al, we do not decide whether the voir dire
sufficient to reveal circumstances of reliships that would warrant challenges for
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cause ...." Id.
Read in its full context, we believe that Hornsby supports our holding today. The trial
judge in Hornsby asked one general question
to the jury panel regarding whether the juror's
affiliation with the L.D.S. Church would
affect the juror's ability to be fair and impartial. This question was designed to detect any
potential bias which would require further
probing. Similarly, the trial judge in the
instant case asked the jurors' if any of them
had been the victim of a crime similar to that
with which the defendant was charged. In Hornsby, no juror responded positively and,
therefore, there was no need to probe further
to investigate this potential bias. In the instant
case, however, three jurors did respond affirmatively. The fact that the Hornsby court was
not required to probe further when no potential bias was detected does not relieve the
trial court in the instant case of its duty to
probe further when potential bias was detected.
We now turn to the sufficiency of the trial
court's questioning in the instant case. Attempting to rebut the potential bias created
when three jurors admitted to being victims of
the same crime for which the defendant was
on trial, the trial judge simply asked:
Those three of you who have responded, recognizing that this is a
different time and place and circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be
fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside
that experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear
and the credibility of the witnesses?
If you would not be able to do so, I
want you to raise your hand.
None of the jurors raised his hand, nor were
any allowed to make a verbal response. We
are concerned that the one general question
was not sufficient to rebut the potential bias
raised by juror VanLeeuwen's comment regarding his prior victimization in light of the
fact that the court posed this question only to
the group of prospective jurors who had been
victims of similar crimes without probing each
individual juror separately to determine the
effect of the experience on the particular
juror. There was never a personalized dialogue
which would have given VanLeeuwen a chance
to express his latent feelings.
Our concern about juror VanLeeuwen is
further compounded by the fact that the trial
judge initially agreed to remove all three prospective jurors based upon their identical
passive responses on the grounds that they had
been victims of the same crime and, therefore,
could not be impartial. Once a trial judge has
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found that a juror should be removed for name issued on April 2, 1991. (157 Utah A
cause, it is highly unusual for this juror to be Rep. 66)
reinstated without further voir dire to develop
new facts to support the change of direction.8
1. The dissent contends that VanLeeuwen was i
The trial judge subsequently reinstated stricken for cause at the sidebar conference,
VanLeeuwen on the panel, explaining his official jury list, however, indicates that all i
extraordinary action by stating that VanLee- jurors were initially removed for cause at this
uwen's experience had occurred in a foreign ference. On this list, the names of jurors F
country and, therefore, would not affect his Tyler and VanLeeuwen are crossed out with
impartiality. The dissent relies on the second notation "for cause" written next to all three nai
finding of the trial judge that VanLeeuwen Subsequently, the notation "foreign country"
included next to juror VanLeeuwen's name, ii
could serve impartially. We are unpersuaded.- ating the judge felt that VanLeeuwen shouk
The trial judge's conclusion came immediately reinstated because his experience occurred •
after he had removed VanLeeuwen for cause, foreign country.
presumably because VanLeeuwen could not be
The dissent correctly states that since no re
fair and impartial. Subsequent to VanLee- was made of the initial conference, "[w)e must
uwen's removal, the trial judge received no ... on the subsequent reconstruction of that coi
new information on which to logically base his ence made on the record ...." Contrary to
conclusion that VanLeeuwen could act as a dissent's assertion, however, this reconstruc
fair and impartial juror and thus should be support's defendant's view. Counsel for defen^
reconstructed the conference as follows:
reinstated.
I believe at the end of voir dire the
Additionally, there is no logical basis for
Court gave me an opportunity to-or
assuming that a victim of an identical crime in
the Court asked me if I had any challea foreign country will be less biased. In actunges, if I passed the panel for cause,
ality, based on the meager information gathand I said no and approached the bench
ered by the trial court, VanLeeuwen was objand I enumerated three individuals who
ectively the most likely of the three previously
I felt should be challenged for cause.
victimized jurors to be biased. Juror Hoyt was
Those individuals were Mr. Mark Hoyt,
Mr. Chris VanLeeuwen, and Mr. James
the victim of theft and use of his credit card,
Tyler, and I believe at that time the
not forgery. Additionally, although juror
Court did strike the three individuals for
Tyler was the victim of an identical crime, that
cause. The bases were they were victims
experience occurred thirty years ago in 1961.
of a similar crime to Mr. Woolley's, the
The remoteness of the incident suggests less
Defendant in this case.
possibility of current bias. In contrast, VanShortly thereafter the Court reinstated
Leeuwen was the victim of a recent identical
Mr. VanLeeuwen indicating that because
crime involving a substantial dollar amount.
the crime had been perpetrated in a
foreign country that that was a signifiBased upon the totality of the circumstances
cant difference.
involved in this voir dire, we cannot say the
Neither the state nor the court objected to •
record supports a finding that VanLeeuwen
was a fair and impartial prospective juror. reconstruction in the record below. Furthermore,
state does not assert a contrary view of the event
Contrary to the statement of the dissent, we its brief on appeal.
do not reverse this case based solely on the
The dissent correctly notes that subsequently,
fact that only one question was asked by the court did state that it "determined based
9
trial judge. Our reversal is based on the tot- [VanLeeux en'sj responses, not to strike him." 1
ality of the circumstances surrounding voir language, however, is taken out of context a*
dire. We are troubled that the three jurors refers not to the court's initial decision to rem
were not questioned individually and each VanLeeuwen but only to the court's subsequ
allowed to respond verbally. Additionally, final decision to leave VanLeeuwen on the panel.
VanLeeuwen's reinstatement was the product 2. Previously, Utah courts have used different r
of an irregular procedure in that the trial aseology in defining the discretion afforded a t
judge originally removed VanLeeuwen for judge in dismissing a juror for cause. See, e
Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 459 (motions to disre
cause and then without further fact-gathering prospective jurors are within the sound discretion
reversed his decision. Furthermore, we find no the trial court); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (U*
persuasive distinction between VanLeeuwen
1984) (in reviewing jury selection, some defere:
and the other two prospective jurors who had must be accorded the discretion of the trial cou
also been victims of similar crimes and who State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983) (
the trial judge presumably found could not be question of the partiality of prospective jur
fair and impartial as he removed them for remains largely within the discretion of the t:
cause. We therefore reverse and remand for a court); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 19'
(applying the "some deference" standard); State
new trial.
Dixon, 560 P.2d 318 (Utah 1977) (matter of possi;
bias
or prejudice of jurors rests within the sot.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
discretion of the trial court); State v. Jonas,
I CONCUR:
P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.denied, __P.2c
Pamela T..Greenwood, Judge
(Utah 1990) (citing Gotschall as the approprL
*This opinion replaces the opinion of the same
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standard of review); State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934
(Utah CL App. 1990) (citing Gotschall as the appropriate standard of review). We do not believe,
however, the different wording has actually affected
the extent of deference afforded on appeal.
3. Although the Jenkins court applied a "some
deference" standard rather than the "sound discretion" standard, regardless of the standard applied,
ihe judge's exercise of discretion must be viewed in
light of this factor.
4. See, e.g., State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah
1989) (holding that defendant was entitled to new
trial where prosecutor struck Hispanic juror to get
even with defense counsel who had insisted that
Hispanics be included on the panel); State v. Pike,
"'l: P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1988) (discussing rationale for presumption of prejudice where improper
contact between jurors and witnesses or court personnel occurs).
5. The dissent notes that in 1988, the United States
Supreme Court held in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81 (1988) that as long as the jury which actually sat
for the case was impartial, it is unimportant that
defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge
to excuse a prospective juror. The dissent then states
that if we find that VanLeeuwen should have been
removed for cause, we must reevaluate the Hewitt
line of cases in light of Ross.
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian after Ross
was decided. We assume that the court considered Ross when deciding Gotschall and Julian, but
chose to stay with its longstanding rule that "[a]
court commits prejudicial error if it forces a party
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror who should have been removed for
cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; see also Julian,
771 P.2d at 1064 n.ll. Accordingly, we assume this
is still the law in Utah.
6. This test was summarized in Cobb when the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "[w)hen comments are
made which facially question a prospective juror's
impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may
occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the
court or unless the court or counsel investigates and
finds the inference rebutted." Cobb, 114 P.2d at
1126.
7. The dissent cites Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1123, as a
case in which the circumstances are "similar" to
those of the instant case. The juror in Cobb referred
to by the dissent disclosed during voir dire that she
had known the prosecutor 15 years earlier when he
was a senior in high school. In comparing Cobb to
the instant case, however, the dissent fails to acknowledge several important distinguishing facts. First,
unlike our case, the juror was individually questioned and asked to explain the relationship and
whether it would affect her impartiality. Furthermore, the use of the language that the relationship
"was not that which would warrant an inference of
bias" is taken out of context as it comes in light of
her answers to the questions probing her potential
bias. Additionally, the Cobb court did not engage in
the extraordinary practice of initially dismissing a
juror for cause and then inexplicably reinstating him
as did the trial court in the instant case.
8. The initial removal of the three challenged jurors
and subsequent reinstatement of juror VanLeeuwen
took place during a sidebar conference outside the
presence of the court reporter. Consequently, no
record of this conference was made.
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9. The dissent faults defense counsel for not asking
for further questions to probe the potential bias of
the three jurors, claiming that this failure constituted a waiver of defendant's right to complain on
appeal. This criticism ignores the fact that after the
judge's questioning, counsel moved to remove all
three jurors for cause. This motion was granted
and, therefore, there was no logical reason for
counsel to encourage the court to probe further at
that time.

BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
The majority concludes that the trial court
abused its discretion because it did not make
adequate inquiry. Either the majority is requiring rehabilitative-like inquiry in all cases
where there is only a question of potential
bias, or it is holding for the first time that
there is a per se inference of bias that must be
rebutted whenever a prospective juror has
previously been a victim of a similar crime.
Both approaches are a departure from our
established case law. I believe the trial court
conducted adequate inquiry once the question
of potential bias arose because there was no
inference of bias or actual bias evidenced by
prospective juror VanLeeuwen's comments.
Further, I believe that the defendant waived
any objection to the extent or manner of voir
dire conducted and has therefore not preserved
that issue for appeal; alternatively, defendant
has not satisfied his burden on appeal to
demonstrate that VanLeeuwen could not have
been impartial.
DEGREES OF "BIAS"
There are three degrees of "bias" that may
surface during voir dire: a question of potential bias, an inference of bias, and actual bias.
The extent of inquiry to be conducted by a
trial court depends on which degree of bias
surfaces. If a prospective juror has previously
been the victim of a similar crime, there is a
legitimate question as to whether that experience has caused the prospective juror to
become biased. When such a question arises,
the trial court must probe to determine
whether the prospective juror is, in fact,
impartial in spite of the past experience.
Typically this is accomplished by the trial
court simply asking if the juror can be impartial. See, e.g., State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1990); Hornsby v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929,
932 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If after probing the
prospective juror's state of mind the trial
court is satisfied that the prospective juror is
nevertheless impartial, that is the end of the
inquiry.
If, on the other hand, the prospective juror,
in response to such probing, makes comments
that "facially question a prospective juror's
partiality or prejudice," the court will infer
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bias as a matter o( law. Scare v. Cobb, 774
P.2d 1123, 1126-28 (Utah 1989). Once an
inference of bias occurs because of comments
made by the prospective juror, the trial court
must either remove the prospective juror or
rebut the inference with further inquiry. Id. at
1126. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 605 P,2d 765,
768 (Utah 1980) (trial court failed to remove
or inquire further of prospective juror who
stated that he would give greater weight to
testimony of peace officer). An inference of
bias is rebutted when the rehabilitative inquiry
shows that a prospective juror is "willing to
keep an open mind and apply the law as the
court instructs]." Cobb, 114 P.2d at 1127.
Questions of bias and inferences of bias are
not to be confused with actual bias as evidenced by a prospective juror's "attitude of
bias" or "strong feelings" that indicate the
prospective juror has a closed mind. Once
such strong feelings are revealed, a prospective
juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror
later asserts that he or she can render an
impartial verdict. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d
473, 475 (Utah 1987) (prospective jurors knew
the murder victim's family and expressed
strong feelings of bias); Srare v. Brooks, 631
P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of
crime expressed strong feelings of anger and
frustration about their victimization); State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26-27 (Utah 1989)
(prospective juror had strong and deep impressions and would not indicate that he could
be impartial). Obviously, if a prospective
juror's comments indicate that he or she has a
closed mind then he or she must be removed
for cause and no amount of inquiry will be
sufficient to rehabilitate. Jones, 734 P.2d at
475. Although no claim is made that VanLeeuwen was in fact biased, the majority nevertheless erroneously seeks to apply the actual
bias analysis to the present case.
The majority opinion falters because it fails
to recognize the differences between a
"question of potential bias" that arises because
of a fact situation, an "inference of bias" that
arises because of a prospective juror's comments, and "actual bias" that arises when a
juror reveals strong and deep impressions of
bias. A prospective juror who is found to be
impartial following the general probing that
occurs when a question of potential bias arises
clearly does not need to go through rehabilitative inquiry in order to ensure that he or she
will act impartially.
The fact that a prospective juror was previously a victim of a similar crime raises a question about potential bias which requires
general probing into the prospective juror's
state of mind in light of that experience.
However, unless the prospective juror makes
comments that facially bring into question his
or her impartiality, there is no inference of
bias raised, see, e.g., Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 2526, nor is there actual bias shown, see, e.g.,
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Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court m\
find any inference of bias, or determine tl
actual bias exists, "based upon the juror's <.
pressed feelings, attitudes, and opinion^
Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (emphasis addec
Because the trial court did not find an in ft
ence of bias in this case, there was obviou^
no need for it to conduct further inquiry
rebut such an inference.
In State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126, a pr
spective juror indicated that she was acqu
nted with the prosecutor. The revelation •
this fact raised a question of potential bi.
that required additional probing. The probi:
revealed that she had known him fifteen yea
earlier when he was a senior in high schoc
He had been friends with her daughter and t!
two families had belonged to the same chun
group. When asked if her association with t)
prosecutor would have caused her to 1
swayed to his side, she responded that
would not. The supreme court held that tl
trial court did not err in refusing to dismi
the prospective juror for cause because tl
prospective juror's answers revealed that he
acquaintance with the prosecutor "was not tr
type of relationship that would warrant an h
ference of bias." Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the trial court asked &
prospective jurors to raise a hand if they coul
not try the case based only on the evident
they heard. No hands were raised. The tru
court also asked the panel members to raise
hand if there were any reasons they could nc
be impartial in deciding defendant's guilt o
innocence. None of the jurors did. The tria
court then questioned whether the jurors, i
placed in the position of either the defendar
or the State, would be satisfied by being trie
by a juror of the panel member's frame o
mind or attitude toward the case. Once again
none of he jurors gave any response indica
ting potential bias.
After the trial court had concluded its ow;
voir dire, it invited counsel to ask their owi
questions, directed through the court. Defense
counsel requested that the prospective juror
be asked if they had ever been victims o
crimes similar to that of which the defendant
was accused. Three answered in the affirma
tive. The experiences of each prospective juro^
were briefly related. The trial court then askec
all three prior victims whether they could se:
aside their prior experiences and act in a fai:
and impartial manner.
Those three of you who have
responded, recognizing that this is a
different time and place and circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be
fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside
that experience and hear the evid-
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ence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear
and the credibility of the witnesses?
If you would not be able to do so, I
want you to raise your hand.
(Emphasis added.)
one of those questioned raised a hand.
The only fault the majority finds in this case
that the trial court did not ask enough
jestions before concluding that VanLeeuwen
as impartial. 1 Once the trial court is satisfied
tat a prospective juror is impartial, however,
lere is no reason for it to continue with
nnecessary questioning. The scope of the
tquiry, is left to the sound discretion of the
ial court because only the trial court knows
hen it is satisfied that the prospective jurors
re impartial. See Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. See
Iso State v. Gotshall, 782 P.2d 459, 462
Jtah 1989); Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906.2 The
etermination of whether or not a prospective
aror is impartial is a factual determination
lade from the "advantaged position" of the
rial court to determine "which persons would
ie fair and impartial jurors." Jenkins v.
>arrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). The
najority therefore faults the procedure used
>y the trial court in reaching its factual
inding. I, on the other hand, believe the
nquiry was procedurally sufficient.
The single question asked by the trial court
>nce it had heard the experiences of the three
Drior victims is similar to that asked in Hornsby,
758 P.2d 902, wherein the trial court
nquired:
Are there any of you who feel that
you would have trouble being an
impartial juror because of feelings
you may have either pro or con
with regard to the L.D.S. Church
that you think might affect your
ability to be a fair and impartial
juror in this case? If so, I'd like
you to raise your hand.
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
As in the present case, none of the prospective jurors raised a hand. We recognized in
Hornsby that one of the purposes of voir dire
is the "detection of bias sufficient to challenge
for cause." Id. at 932. We then held that "the
question asked by the trial court was sufficient
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant
a challenge for cause under subsection (6) [of
Rule 47(0, Utah R. Civ. P.]." Id. (emphasis
added). 3 The majority asserts that one question was not sufficient and relies upon Bailey,
605 P.2d 768 and Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884.
Bailey and Brooks, however, apply only when
there is a strong inference of bias, and that is
not the case before us.
The question asked in the present case
cannot be distinguished from that asked in
Hornsby. The majority fails to show any
defect at all in the question asked. 4 Nor does
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it put forth any additional questions that
should have been asked. 5 Instead, it relies only
upon the total number of questions asked in
the cases that it cites as support without any
analysis of the substance of those questions. 6
An examination of many of those cases reveals
that the higher number of questions resulted
not from rehabilitative questioning, but from
the prospective jurors giving equivocal answers
when asked if they could be impartial. 7
In the present case, the prospective jurors'
answers were unequivocal and therefore did
not require any additional inquiry. Absent
some explanation as to why the inquiry conducted by the trial court was insufficient, we
may not say that the trial court abused its
discretion in not inquiring further. We certainly may not declare the trial court's finding
to be clearly erroneous simply because it did
not first ask a magical number of questions.
Another distinction that should be drawn
between the present case and the cases relied
upon by the majority is that in many of those
cases counsel, not the trial court, conducted
the extended inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Julian,
111 P.2d 1061, 1065-66 (Utah 1989) (defense
counsel asked the twenty questions referred to
by the majority, not the trial court). Rule
18(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides counsel an opportunity to ask additional questions with leave of the trial court.
Defense counsel in the present case requested
the question regarding prior victimization, but
did not request any additional probing once
the victimization question and the trial court's
follow-up question regarding impartiality
were asked. Defendant's failure to object to
the extent of the voir dire conducted by the
trial court "constitutes a waiver and bars
inquiry into the bias question." State v.
DeWille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988)
(defendant's evidence of juror bias discovered
post-trial was properly refused by trial court
in motion for new trial when "quite foreseeable" issue of potential bias was not raised by
defendant during voir dire). See also State v.
Miller, 614 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (trial
court failed to inquire of jurors whether there
would be prejudice in their minds because the
case involved a motorcycle club; defense
counsel's failure to object, to remind the
judge of the oversight, to make a new request,
or to ask personally to voir dire the jury,
effectively waived the error). Defendant has
therefore not preserved the issue for appeal. 8
See Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff waived any objection
at trial when it did not attempt to call the
court's attention to a specific question it
desired the court to ask on voir dire and
thereby did not preserve the issue for appeal).
Even if defendant had preserved the issue
for appeal, he failed to meet his burden of
proof on appeal. "Defendant did not demonstrate on the trial record, or on appeal, that
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[the prospective juror] could not act in a fair
and impartial manner." Layton City v.
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884). See also
Ross v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 81, 108
S.Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (defendant "failed to
establish that the jury was not impartial"),
Nor has defendant demonstrated that he was
not "afforded an adequate opportunity to gain
the information necessary to evaluate" VanLeeuwen. Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. "The
trial court abuses its discretion when,
'considering the totality of the questioning,
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to
evaluate jurors.'" Id. (quoting Bishop, 753
P.2d at 448). Defendant has simply failed to
show how VanLeeuwen was partial, or how he
was prevented in any way from gaining sufficient information about VanLeeuwen to know
whether he was partial
The majority cannot say that the trial court
did not conduct adequate inquiry simply
because it might have conducted more. Once
the trial court was satisfied that the prospective jurors were impartial, it did not need to
probe any further. If defense counsel was not
satisfied that the prior victims were impartial,
then it should have requested additional
probing. 9 The trial court therefore did not
abuse its discretion in asking only one question when the question asked was "sufficient
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant
a challenge for cause." Hornsby, 758 P.2d at
932 (emphasis added).
PER SE INFERENCE OF BIAS
Since VanLeeuwen made no comments to
call into question his impartiality, no inference
of bias was raised under our traditional analysis. Bias is only inferred when the "comments"
of the prospective juror raise a facial question as to the prospective juror's partiality.
Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added). Accord Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26 (fact that
prospective juror had prior involvement in
drug abuse and distribution investigations did
not create an inference of bias where no
comments were made to call into question his
impartiality).10 The majority's ruling expressly
requires trial courts to rebut an inference of
bias whenever the court learns of prior victimization. The majority's ruling therefore
creates a per se inference of bias that attaches
automatically whenever a prospective juror is
a prior victim of a similar crime. The majority
fails to provide any legal or public policy
support for such a ruling. The majority's
approach, in fact, is contrary to our case iaw. n
A recent decision from this court indicates
that prior victimization of a similar crime does
not, per se, raise an inference of bias. In State
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.) cert,
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), a prospe-

CODE9
Pro\o, I

ctive juror revealed during voir dire that s
had recently been the victim of a theft in\t
ving approximately $13,000 worth of tooi
When asked whether the previous theft wou.
affect her impartiality, the prospective jun
answered, "If it was tools, I might be a litt
influenced/' Id. at 906. She equivocate
further by admitting that it was "a little har
to say" whether the prior incident would affe
her ability to be impartial, but eventual I
affirmed her ability to remain impartial upc
further questioning by the trial court. Id. Th
court held that no inference of bias wa
demonstrated by the voir dire questionin
because, although the prospective juror exp,
essed some equivocation, she ultimately mar
ifested her ability to be impartial. Id. at 90~
This court reasoned that since the case did nc
involve tools, "it could be inferred that th
prior experience would not influence her a
all." Id. Such reasoning reveals that prio
victimization does not automatically raise .
per se inference of bias that must be rebutted
See State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5
13-14 (1978); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55,
402 A.2d 203, 207 (1979).
The majority summarily assumes, however
as a matter of law and in a technical fashion
that all prior victims are not indifferent to the
case before them. "'Impartiality' is not a
technical conception but is a state of mind; \\
is a mental attitude of appropriate indifference." Srare v. Brooks, 565 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah 1977). If the prior victimization of the
prospective juror in Jonas did not prevent her
from being indifferent, then there is no reason
to assume that VanLeeuwen's prior victimization prevented him from being indifferent. In
general, prospective jurors who affirm their
impartiality are presumed to be impartial
unless proven otherwise. See State v. Dixon,
560 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1977) (when prospective jurors "gave their word that they had no
such bias or prejudice but could act as fair
jurors[,] [i]t is to be assumed that they were
not swearing falsely and that they believed
they could act as conscientious arbiters in the
case.").
Victimization of minor crimes is an unfortunate part of living in today's society. I do
not believe that the risk of universal bias
among prior victims is so great that it warrants a per se inference of bias that must automatically be rebutted in each and every case.
In a great majority of the cases, a general
probing, such as the probing conducted by the
trial court in this case, will be sufficient to
reveal those prior victims who might not be
impartial. The majority's ruling will therefore
create a significant burden upon our trial
courts without creating any real benefit.
CONCLUSION
I respectfully dissent from the majority's
holding because it requires prospective jurors
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be rehabilitated before any inference of bias
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931.
2. Contrary to the majority's assertion in its second
> even been established. I view the trial
footnote, there is a real distinction between the
jrt's decision to have been a factual deterphraseology used in expressing the appropriate stanation that VanLeeuwen was impartial and
ndard of review. If a matter is within the "sound
before was capable of sitting on the jury
discretion" of a trial court, then the appellate courts
thout any rehabilitative inquiry. Inasmuch
will give maximum deference to the trial court's
VanLeeuwen said nothing that would facidetermination. The granting of only "some defery challenge his impartiality, we should give
ence" is obviously a more searching review. The
s trial court's factual determination the
majority claims to be giving maximum deference
ference it deserves.
when in fact it is granting only "some deference/ if
that much, to the trial court's determination of the
The majority asserts that the approach recappropriate scope of voir dire. Inasmuch as Gotsc;nized in this dissent would be difficult to
hall is the most recent Utah Supreme Court case, I
Iminister. Let me summarize the approach in
believe that the "sound discretion" standard enunc, simplest terms. When facts raise a question
iated therein governs our review in this case and that
* whether a prospective juror may be biased,
the majority's departure therefrom is error.
e trial court must probe until it is satisfied
3. The majority erroneously describes this statement
iat the prospective juror is in fact impartial.
as dicta. At issue in Hornsby was whether the voir
a prospective juror makes comments that
dire was sufficient with regards to the prospective
jurors' feelings toward the L.D.S. Church. Voir
IOW he or she is probably
biased, then the
dire has two functions, "the detection of bias suffiial court must ask questions to rebut that
cient to challenge for cause," and "the collection of
iference. If a prospective juror makes comdata to permit informed exercise of the peremptory
lents that reveal strong and deep impressions
challenge." Srare v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah
f bias, no rehabilitative inquiry is needed-1983). In Hornsby, we first reviewed the detection
iat juror must be removed. I believe this
of bias issue and found that the single question was
pproach is much simpler and" gives more
sufficient to detect bias for purposes of subsection
(6) of Rule 47(0- We did not consider "whether the
uidance to our trial courts than simply saying
voir dire was sufficient to reveal circumstances or
hat the amount of inquiry needed will vary
relationships that would warrant challenges for
rom case to case and in this case it just
cause under other subsections of Rule 47(f),"
imply was not enough.
because that issue was not necessary to the appeal.
I also believe that this issue was not propHornsby, 758 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
rly preserved for appeal and that, even if it
Instead, we reversed the case because the voir dire
vas, defendant has failed to meet his burden
was insufficient to permit the plaintiff an opportu)f showing that VanLeeuwen could not have
nity to collect data for the informed use of the
peremptory challenge. The majority's partial quote
icted in a fair and impartial manner or that he
is therefore misleading because it implies that we did
vas prevented from obtaining enough infornot make any decision relating to challenges for
nation to make that determination. 12
cause, when in fact we expressly made such a ruling
I would therefore affirm.
under subsection (6).
Russell W. Bench, Judge
4. The majority attempts to distinguish Hornsby by
pointing out that there were no affirmative respo1. The majority claims that the record does not
nses to the general question asked in Hornsby while
support a finding that VanLeeuwen was a fair and
there were positive responses in the present case.
impartial juror. The burden of challenging this
The majority's analysis, however, ignores the fact
factual finding, however, has not been met by defthat the ultimate issue of impartiality addressed by
endant. "In the absence of a record or transcript
one question in Hornsby was addressed by two
supporting defendant's factual contentions on
questions in this case. The Hornsby court asked if
appeal, and upon defendant's failure to marshal
the prospective jurors had any feelings toward the
evidence that shows the ruling to be clearly erronL.D.S. Church that would prevent them from being
eous, we presume that the ruling is adequately supimpartial. If the Hornsby court had broken this
ported by the clear weight of the evidence." Srare v.
question into two parts and first asked, "does any
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App.
prospective juror have feelings towards the L.D.S.
1990) (citations omitted).
Church," it probably would have received affirmative responses. Conversely, had the trial court in the
Even if the defendant were to marshal the evidpresent case asked the single question, "have any of
ence in support of the trial court's finding-you been the victim of a similar crime that would
which includes the four affirmative, unequivocal
prevent you from being impartial," it would not
responses by VanLeeuwen that he could be impartialhave received any affirmative responses. The inter-there is no evidence of bias on the record to show
mediate positive response, that the majority claims
that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous.
distinguishes this case from Hornsby, simply is not
The majority is therefore left to attack the procedeterminative because the ultimate response was the
dure used by the trial court in order to show any
same-the prospective jurors would be impartial.
abuse of discretion. In addition to its concerns
about the extent of the inquiry, the majority indic5. The trial court had already asked three different
ates that it is bothered by the fact there was no
questions designed to elicit any bias before the issue
individualized questioning of the three prospectse
of prior victimization even arose in this case. Inasjurors, but it offers no precedent or analysis to
much as we must look at the "totality" of the voir
support its assertion that individualized questioning
dire in order to determine whether a trial court has
is required. In the past, this court has accepted
abused its discretion, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
collective questioning without comment. See, e.g.,
448 (Utah 1988), the majority errs in not considering
,o, Utah
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the impact of these previous questions as well.
When the totality ot the voir dire is considered, it is
clear that the three questions initially asked by the
trial court, plus the question following the discovery
of the prior victimization, were "sufficient to detect
any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for
cause." Hornsby, 758 P,2d at 932.
6. in general, the types of questions fall into three
groups: (1) factual questions regarding the prospective juror's experiences; (2) questions probing the
prospective juror's self-perceived state of mind
and whether those experiences would affect his or
her ability to act impartially; and (3) questions rebutting inferences of bias by inquiring whether the
prospective juror understands his or her role and is
willing to be impartial. The majority fails to consider whether the questions asked in the cases cited
are factual, probing, or rehabilitative. Absent such
analysis, the cases cited are useless in determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion in the
present case.
7. The following voir dire colloquy between the trial
court and a prospective juror in Jonas is a prime
example of extended inquiry due to equivocal
answers.
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate
to ask this question, but I'm obligated
to. Have any of you been the victims of
a theft? And that, as I've indicated to
you before what a theft really is, taking
property of another with intent to permanently deprive them, or in receiving.
Well, we'll take that first. 1 saw some
hands go up in the jury box ....
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
Yes, my husband had about $13,000
worth of tools stolen about a year and a
half ago which we have neverTHE COURT: Did a criminal act
result from that~or action?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
No, it was reported to the police, which
they didn't do anything about, and we
still have never gottenTHE COURT: They didn't find it?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
(shook head from side to side)
THE COURT: How long ago was
that?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
About a year and a half ago.
THE COURT: Keeping that incident
in mind, as I indicated, there are different parties involved, but sometimes
based on our experience we allow thai to
interfere with our thinking.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
It might be. If it was tools, I might be a
little influenced.
THE COURT: Well, wait just a
minute. Let me ask the questions and
you just answer the question.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
All right.
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind,
do you believe that that incident would
make it difficult for you to be fair and
impartial, particularly to this Defendant,
a well as the people of the state of
Utah?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
UTAH ADVA
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It's a little hard to say.
THE COURT: Well, you just take
time to think it over because weyou're the one thatPROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
It probably would, yes.
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs.PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
Smith, Donna Smith.
THE COURT: You don't believe that
you could set those facts aside and make
a determination on the evidence that's
presented in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
I—well, yes, I believe I could be
impartial.
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 905-06.
8. Contrary to the majority's assertion that the
motion to strike was granted as to all three prior
victims, and therefore defense counsel did not need
to ask for further probing to preserve the issue, the
record reveals that Hoyt and Tyler were removed,
but that VanLeeuwen was never removed.
No record was made of the actual sidebar conference at which time defendant claims VanLeeuwen
was removed and reinstated, but the conference was
later reconstructed on the record. We must therefore
rely upon the subsequent reconstruction of that
conference made on the record. Slate v. Suarez, 793
P.2d 934, 936 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Defense
counsel rehearsed how it had made a motion to
remove Hoyt, Tyler and VanLeeuwen and then
stated: "I believe at that time the Court did strike
the three individuals for cause .... Shortly thereafter
the Court reinstated Mr. VanLeeuwen ...." The trial
court stated that it was the court's view at the
sidebar conference that all three prospective jurors
could be fair and impartial and that the state's
objection to striking VanLeeuwen was particularly
well taken because his experience occurred in a
foreign country. The trial court then indicated that
at sidebar it "determined based on his responses not
to strike him." (Emphasis added). Defense counsel
did not make any protest to the trial court's assertion that it did not strike VanLeeuwen.
Defense counsel's statement that VanLeeuwen
was stricken and later reinstated is without any
support in the transcript and is directly contrary to
the trial court's express declaration that it did not
strike VanLeeuwen. Defense counsel therefore did
not preserve the issues of insufficient inquiry or the
alleged irregular "reinstatement" of VanLeeuwen.
See id. The only issue properly preserved for appeal
is the question of whether VanLeeuwen should have
been dismissed for cause based on the answers given.
9. Had defendant so requested, additional questions
could have been posed to the three prospective
jurors after defendant made its request to strike for
cause and before the trial court ruled on the motion.
See, e.g., Gotsehall, 782 P.2d at 461; Salt Lake City
v. Tuero, 758 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
10. The majority misconstrues "comments" as
meaning VanLeeuwen's statement that he was a
prior victim. Such an interpretation is clearly not
consistent with the analysis of Brooks. "Whenever
the voir dire evokes a strong emotional response,
there is posed a warning that the juror may not have
the appropriate indifference to the party or cause
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emrnasis addeoi. VanLeeuwen's response in this
;a>e obviously *as not a "strong emotional respThe majont> iAso misconstrues the language of
Coc? by asserting that the inference that arises from
r ncr victimization must be rebutted, but that the
prospective juror need not necessarily be removed.
Such an approach is a clear departure from Cobb,
*hich requires the prospective juror to be removed
,f an inference of bias is not rebutted. Cobb, 774
P.2d at 1126.
11. The majority's approach is also contrary to our
established rules of procedure. Fact situations that
raise a concern serious enough to create a per se
inference of bias are enumerated in rule 18(e) of the
Ltah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior victimizjtion is not one of those per se grounds. Rule
18(e)(4), for example, provides that the following
fact situations automatically constitute grounds for
remo\ ing a prospective juror:
the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any
party, witness or person alleged to have
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable
minds that the prospective juror would
be unable or unwilling to return a
verdict which would be free of favoritism.
12. The majority fails to adequately address an alternative basis for affirmance that has been properly
raised and is before us. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Usocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). VanI ccuwen did not sit as a juror, but was removed on
a peremptory challenge by defendant. The law in
this jurisdiction has historically been that it is prejudicial error for the trial court "to compel a party
;o exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror
*ho should have been removed for cause." Hewitt,
^9 P.2d at 25. The State urges that if this court
mds that VanLeeuwen should have been removed
'or cause, as the majority does, then we must reevaluate the Hewitt line of cases in light of the recent
*a* of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct.
:r< (1988). The United States Supreme Court held
Vrcin that where a juror who should have been
reused for cause was rem ved by defendant's
peremptory challenge, "[ajny claim that the jury was
~w mpartial was required to focus, not on [the
m~*d jurorj, but on the jurors who ultimately
*i * 108 S.Ct. at 2277. The Supreme Court reas**d that as long as the jury which actually sat for
V .asc was impartial, it was unimportant that
Vrr.dant was forced to use a peremptory challenge
•a noise a prospective juror. 108 S.Ct. at 2278
« * ! Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436, 7 S.Ct.
M4.M6CI887)).
'" ^evv of the majority's reversal, this alternative
iTjsxnt deserves discussion. The majority erronexv>
'assumes" that this issue has been considered
s
'Se Ltah Supreme Court since it has decided two
*"« -emoval cases subsequent to the Ross decision
^ ^ *Mied bv the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as
•!^4?c courts are limited to the issues properly
*" ^n aPP^aI, the majority's assumption is unfx
***vl
Since the Utah Supreme Court has never
W^NVcd thl«
* • • - sue directly, the majority's ruling
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places it squarely before us now.
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED PARCEL and/or Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company,
Petitioners,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, and
Kyle Lyman,
Respondents.
No. 900174-CA
FILED: April 10, 1991
Original Proceeding in this Court.
ATTORNEYS:
Denton M. Hatch, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioner
Virginius Dabney, Erie V. Boorman, and
David Libby, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Petitioners, United Parcel and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, appeal from the
Industrial Commission's Order awarding respondent Lyman compensation for injuries
sustained on July 22, 1981. United Parcel
claims that the Industrial Commission lacked
jurisdiction to award such compensation due
to Lyman's failure to timely file the requisite
claim for compensation under Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-99 (Supp. 1981). We find that
the Commission lacked jurisdiction and therefore reverse the Commission's Order.

FACTS
Lyman's accident occurred on July 22,
1981. In August 1981, United Parcel discharged Lyman for reasons unrelated to the accident. Lyman sought medical treatment for a
back injury, which culminated in surger. for a
herniated disk in September 1981. L>man's
physicians filed medical reports with the Industrial Commission (Commission), with copies
to Liberty Mutual Insurance, which were received on September 17, 1981. On September
22, 1981, United Pared filed a report of the
injury with the Commission. Lyman's physicians also filed progress notes on November 2,
1981 and December 18, 1981.
On or about September 28, 1982, the
C o m m i s s i o n r e c e i v e d the " I n s u r a n c e

ADDENDUM B

1 , officer?
i

2 '

THE COURT:

I will instruct you, members of the

3 ' ]ury panel, at a later point in this trial that you are to
4

give no more or less credibility to the testimony of a law

5 I enforcement official than you would to any other witness.
6 ' The fact that they are employed as a law enforcement officer
7

does not give more or less credibility to their testimony.
i

8

Now, having stated that, are there any among you who are so

9

persuaded that law enforcement officers are more credible or

10

less credible than other witnesses that you couldn't be fair

11

and impartial in judging their testimony?

12

hand.

13

No hands are raised.

14

MR. LOYD:

Thank you, your Honor.

If so, raise your

Could you

15 i inquire if any of them — I believe you asked them if any of
16
the jurors had been accused of a forgery type crime. Could
17
you ask if any of their close friends or relatives have ever
18
been the victim of forgery, theft, or any crime involving
19
fraud or pecuniary loss?
20
THE COURT: Are there those among you first,
21
members of the panel, who have yourselves been the victim of
22
23

a forgery or a crime involving deception or fraud?

If so, I

J want you to raise your hand.

4 !

Mr. Hoyt, you yourself have been the victim of

2 cr [
J

• such a circumstance?
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,

MR. HOYT:

2

Yes, sir.

My wallet was taken when I

was m California and my credit card was used.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. VANLEEUWEN:

5

Very well, and Mr. VanLeeuwen?
I was in Brazil at the time that

they stole checks and wrote about five grand on my account.

6

THE COURT:

?

Very well.

No other hands are raised,

Counsel.

8

Those of you, Messrs. Hoyt and VanLeeuwen, who

9

have responded to that question —

10

oh, excuse me.

Mr. Tyler?

11

MR. TYLER:

Yes, I was robbed of some checks and a

guy forged some checks on my when I lived in L.A. in f 61.

12
13

THE COURT:

14

Very well.

Thank you, Mr. Tyler.

No

other hands are raised.

15

Those three of you who have responded, recognizing

16

that this is a different time and place and circumstance,

17

would that experience, having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be fair and impartial in

19 ' this case, that is, would you be unable to set aside that
20

experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on
!

21
22
2

the evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility of
j the witnesses?

If you would not be able to do so, I want

^ | you to raise your hand.

24

No hands are raised, Mr. Loyd.

25

MR. LOYD:

Thank you, your Honor,
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Members of the jury, at this point we'll take our
noon recess given the fact that we could not really start
another witness right now, and I will ask you to remember
the admonition I've given you and to be back here at 1:30
this afternoon, at which time we'll reconvene and hear the
next witness.
Court will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
Counsel, we'll discuss further the issue that
we've talked about before when we reconvene this afternoon.
Court will be in recess until 1:30.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

The Defendant and counsel are present.

We are outside the hearing of the jury.
Mr. Loyd, I'm now giving you the opportunity to
make your record with regard to the challenge for cause as
to Mr. VanLeeuwen.
MR. LOYD:

You may proceed.
Thank you, your Honor.

I believe at the end of voir dire the Court gave
me an opportunity to —

or the Court asked me if I had any

challenges, if I passed the panel for cause, and I said no
and approached the bench and I enumerated three individuals
who I felt should be challenged for cause.

Those individ-

uals were Mr. Mark Hoyt, Mr. Chris VanLeeuwen, and Mr. James
Tyler, and I believe at that time the Court did strike the
three individuals for cause.

The bases were they were
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victims of a similar crime to Mr. Woolley's, the Defendant
in

this case.
Shortly thereafter the Court reinstated

Mr. VanLeeuwen indicating that because the crime had been
perpetrated in a foreign country that that was a significant
difference.
I would note that Mr. VanLeeuwen, if my recollection's correct and I believe it's on the record, had been
the victim of a forgery, that his checkbook had been stolen,
I believe, in Brazil and checks to the tune of $5,000 had
been written on his account, and it's our contention that he
should not have been replaced on the panel, that the challenge for cause was a good one, that he was the victim of
the same sort of crime with which Mr. Woolley has been
charged, and finally, as part of our peremptory challenges,
in fact, with our first peremptory challenge we did strike
Mr. VanLeeuwen from the panel because of his posture as a
victim of this same sort of crime.
THE COURT:

All right, Mr. Loyd.

Do you wish to respond, Mr. Cope?
MR. COPE:

I would like to add only, your Honor,

that when Mr. Loyd made the motion to strike those three
people for cause, that the State objected to the motion on
the grounds that none of the three people had indicated that
such an involvement in a theft would or had in any way
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lored their thinking or prejudiced them as regards the
-acts of this particular case.
THE COURT:
u,4

It is accurate to state that

VanLeeuwen on voir dire examination indicated that he

*.ad been a victim of a similar crime in the country of
Brazil and had suffered some considerable loss as a result
of that, along with the other two individuals on the panel,
Messrs. Tyler and Hoyt.
It was this Court's view that all three individuals responded to the questioning about that experience
bearing upon their ability to be fair and impartial, each of
the three had indicated that they would be able to set aside
that experience, it f s my recollection, and treat the evidence in this case fairly and impartially, and it appeared
to me that given the further indication that
Mr. VanLeeuwen's experience did occur in a foreign country,
that the objection to striking at least Mr. VanLeeuwen from
that group for cause was well taken and I determined based
upon his responses not to strike him.
Accordingly, that is the rationale behind the
Court's decision in this matter and I presume, Mr. Loyd,
that your motion here is for mistrial.
MR. LOYD:

Yes, your Honor, that would be our

requested relief.
THE COURT:

All right.

Given the circumstances
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1

that have been outlined in the record at this point,

2

Counsel, I'll deny your motion.

3

Let's bring the jury back in, Counsel.

4

(Whereupon, the jury entered the courtroom.)

5

THE COURT:

6

The jury has returned to the

courtroom.

7

Mr. Cope, you may call your next witness.

8

MR. COPE:

9

Call Steven Blaylock.

STEVEN CHARLES BLAYLOCK,

10

called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff,

11

having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

12

follows:

13
14

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. COPE:

15 I

Q

Would you please give us your full name?

16

A

Steven Charles Blaylock.

17

Q

And would you spell Blaylock for us?

18

A

B-1-a-y-l-o-c-k.

19

Q

Mr. Blaylock, are you a resident of Salt Lake

20

County?

21

A

Yes, I am.

22

Q

And do you have a checking account, sir?

23

A

Yes, I do.

24

Q

Do you ever write checks on that checking account?

25

A

Yes, I do.
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ADDENDUM D

Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to
a particular juror and may be taken on one or more
of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications
prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which
renders one incapable of performing the duties
of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree to the person alleged to be
injured by the offense charged, or on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any party,
witness or person alleged to have been
victimized or injured by the defendant, which
relationship when viewed objectively, would
suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling
to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to
or employed by the state or a political
subdivision thereof;

(5) having been or being the party adverse
to the defendant in a civil action, or having
complained against or having been accused by
him in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which
found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the particular
offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally
sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict
was set aside, or which was discharged without
a verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil
action brought against the defendant for the
act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable
with death, the entertaining of such
conscientious opinions about the death penalty
as would preclude the juror from voting to
impose the death penalty following conviction
regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year
preceding, has been engaged or interested in
carrying on any business, calling or
employment, the carrying on of which is a
violation of law, where defendant is charged
with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either
for or against the defendant on the preliminary
examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the cause,
or to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging;
but no person shall be disqualified as a juror
by reason of having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public
rumor, statements in public journals or common
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the
court that the juror can and will,
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to
him.

